Zen­tral­banken: als wären wir im Krieg

Man muss es sich schon vor Augen halten: Die Bilanzen der Noten­banken sind weltweit so explo­diert, dass man denken könne, wir befänden uns im Krieg. Die Folgen könnten ähnlich blutig sein, meinen zwei Kom­men­ta­toren eines eng­li­schen Assetmanagers:

• Zunächst erinnern sie an eine Serie von Morden in den 1930er-Jahren an füh­renden Ver­tretern aus Wirt­schaft und Politik in Japan: „The first name on their death list was Inoue Jun­nosuke, a former Finance Minister, an austerity advocate and former governor of the Bank of Japan (BOJ); he was shot as he visited a nursery school. The next name was Dan Takuma, head of the Mitsui Group, the Japanese Goldman Sachs; he was shot in front of his office in the fashionable Nihon­bashi dis­trict. Further attacks on the BOJ and Mitsu­bishi Bank fol­lowed but were unsuc­cessful. The ‚world of cos­mo­po­litan finance had col­lided with natio­nalist resentment.‘ The liberal elite was stunned, unable to provide answers to the social turmoil of the time; and with the estab­lishment para­lysed, the public began to sym­pa­thise with the killers’ aims.“ – Stelter: Nein, ich halte Gewalt weder für berechtigt, noch für wün­schenswert etc. Ich denke nur, es zeigt, wohin wir kommen können, wenn das geld­po­li­tische Groß­ex­pe­riment, siehe Beitrag von heute Morgen, vor die Wand fährt.
• „Enter Finance Minister Taka­hashi Korekiyo. He pla­cated the natio­na­lists by cham­pioning massive deficit financing, via the BOJ, to pull Japan out of its eco­nomic morass. Japan’s economy soon embarked on a period of eco­nomic growth with stable prices, full employment and humming fac­tories, an ‚eco­nomic nirvana.‘ Seven decades later these results were heralded a success by another central banker trying a similar trick – Ben Ber­nanke.“ – Stelter: Also war die Politik des bil­ligen Geldes damals a) Folge der poli­ti­schen Lage, b) erfolg­reich. Also, warum nicht?
• „Korekiyo’s plan was to fund government spending by having the BOJ directly purchase all the government-issued bonds. The hope was that, when con­di­tions and inflation improved, the bonds would be sold back into the market. Four years later, the BOJ’s balance sheet was 90% of GDP, and the economy (and for ‚economy‘ read military) was totally dependent on government spending financed by the BOJ.“ – Stelter: Da stehen wir nun noch nicht. Die Bilanzen der Noten­banken sind zwar deutlich gewachsen, aber wir haben noch keine direkte Finan­zierung von Staats­aus­gaben. Das kommt als Nächstes!
• „As the first modest hint of inflation arrived Korekiyo attempted to sell government bonds publicly, but the auction failed. With this failure it became clear that the bonds which had been stuffed onto the BOJ’s balance sheet could never be sold. Korekiyo’s struggle to ‘cut up the credit card’ cul­mi­nated in him suf­fering a similar fate to Jun­nosuke and being cut up in an attack of army machetes. As the BOJ’s balance sheet crossed 100% of GDP, there could be no turning back, the road to con­flict had been primed by the BOJ’s swollen balance sheet and the money that had flooded into the military.“ – Stelter: Unter Hitler pas­sierte übrigens das Gleiche. Auch hier war die Notenbank stark in die Finan­zierung der Auf­rüstung involviert.
• „The current Bank of Japan’s balance sheet has now again crossed that fabled 100% of GDP and it is getting close to owning 45% of out­standing government bonds. There is no end in sight with the BOJ buying $60 billion a month of government debt. At this current pace the modern BOJ will by 2019 be the proud owner of 60% of the local bond market. There is no longer a market price for a Japanese Government Bond, it is an asset whose price is set by the BOJ. The key dif­fe­rence between today and the 1930s is that Japan now has an open capital account, the­r­efore the only unte­thered market price is the cur­rency. The Yen’s con­tinued deva­luation will be deep and com­pre­hensive, while Japanese equities will con­tinue to rise, adjusting to the cur­rency loss.“ –Stelter: Und es fließt nicht in Mili­tär­aus­gaben, sondern in all­ge­meine Konjunkturprogramme.
• „Central banks con­tinue to act as the enablers to their respective govern­ments. They provide funding that papers over the under­lying social anxiety, delaying our much needed dia­logue. When his­to­rians look back and see the cavalier balance sheets of the central banks they would rightly assume there was a world war going on as every central bank balance sheet is now approa­ching or exceeding levels not seen since 1945. However, the worrying truth is that there are no external enemies to overcome; the central bankers are only main­taining the growth tra­jectory that we demand.“ – Stelter: Der „Feind“ ist ja auch im Inland. Die unter­fi­nan­zierten Sozi­al­staaten stehen vor dem Offenbarungseid.
• „The current social con­tract is mired in the quicksand of global finance. It is being kept alive by the cor­pulent balance sheets of central banks, who do their government’s bidding so that the poli­ti­cians do not have to put unp­leasant choices in front of their elec­to­rates. This cowardly beha­viour gives rise to slogans and slo­ganeers, who provide familiar but false check­lists of remedies. ‚Take bank control‘… ‚America First‘… ‚One Belt, One Road‘ … ‚Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuhrer‘ … Central banks are curr­ently fur­nishing the excess credit that, in the past, has been fol­lowed by an orgy of blood.„ – Stelter: Wenn auch der Ver­gleich hinkt, ist es doch eine sehr inter­es­sante Beob­achtung. Es kann nicht gut enden, die Frage ist, welches der End­spiel­sze­narien wir erleben werden.

→ clarmond.co.uk: „An Orgy of Blood“, Oktober 2017

Dieser Beitrag stammt von think-beyondtheobvious.com