Heli­kopter-Geld: Das letzte ver­bliebene Mittel zur Ver­zö­gerung der nächsten Krise

Schon seit Langem ver­trete ich die These, dass in der nächsten Phase der Krise die Heli­kopter zum Einsatz kommen werden – das ulti­mative Mittel zum Vermeiden/Verzögern der unwei­ger­lichen Schulden-/Ver­mö­gens­de­flation.
Ent­scheidend ist dafür natürlich eine mög­lichst breite Akzeptanz für das Instrument. Um diese zu erreichen, sind Studien, die den Nutzen zeigen, sicherlich recht nützlich. Womit ich nicht sage, dass diese Studien nicht zutreffend sind. Im Gegenteil, Heli­kopter-Geld dürfte das letzte ver­bliebene Mittel sein. 
Insofern passt eine neue Studie des UCL Institute for Inno­vation and Public Purpose perfekt in die Zeit. Gerade recht­zeitig vor dem Beginn der nächsten Phase der Krise: 
Das ver­gessene Instrument
  • „Policy debates have been focused upon the infla­tionary expec­ta­tions that may be gene­rated by monetary financing or related policies, con­sistent with New Con­sensus Macroe­co­nomics theo­re­tical frame­works. His­to­rical examples of fiscal-monetary policy coor­di­nation have been largely neglected, along with alter­native theo­re­tical views, such as post-Keynesian per­spec­tives that emphasise uncer­tainty and demand rather than rational expec­ta­tions. This paper begins to address this omission.“ – bto: Es wird also unter­sucht, wie die direkte Staats­fi­nan­zierung in der Ver­gan­genheit funk­tio­niert hat.
  • „In par­ti­cular, we focus on the 1930s-1970s period when central banks and minis­tries of finance coope­rated closely, with less inde­pen­dence accorded to monetary policy and greater weight attached to fiscal policy. We find a number of cases where fiscal-monetary coor­di­nation proved useful in sti­mu­lating eco­nomic growth, sup­porting indus­trial policy objec­tives and managing public debt without excessive inflation.“ – bto: was in der Tat wün­schenswert wäre ange­sichts der Lage, in der wir uns befinden. Es geht doch nur darum, die Schul­denlast trag­barer zu machen.
  • „The pro­hi­bition of monetary financing by central banks is a key element of the sepa­ration of fiscal and monetary policy that has become crucial to the New Macroe­co­nomic Con­sensus (NMC), which views inflation-tar­geting via adjus­t­ments to interest rates as the most important activity of the central bank. This framework also prio­ri­tises monetary over fiscal policy, with fiscal policy limited to counter-cyclical short-run sta­bi­li­sation effects.“ bto: Klar ist aber, dass man mit tiefen Zinsen alleine in eine Sack­gasse fährt, in die der Über­schuldung, aus der man so einfach nicht mehr herauskommt.
Macht­beben von Dirk Mueller

Seit der Krise sind die klas­si­schen Instru­mente stumpf
Nach 2009 funk­tio­niert es aber nicht mehr: „Despite short-term interest rates being reduced to zero and quan­ti­tative easing (QE) pro­grams pushing down the yield on medium and long rates, output growth has remained signi­fi­cantly below the pre-crisis period and central banks have repea­tedly undershot their inflation targets. The apparent failure of the standard monetary policy trans­mission mechanism, whereby the lowering of interest rates should feed through to rising inflation and nominal demand in the real economy, has led to fun­da­mental ques­tions being asked of monetary policy. Mean­while, public and private debt to GDP levels have remained highas austerity policies have failed to sti­mulate private sector investment and growth.“ bto: Es wäre gut, wenn wir endlich offen erkennen würden, dass es eben genau an den hohen Schulden liegt, dass es nicht mehr funktioniert. 
  • „The term ‘heli­c­opter money’, popu­la­rised by Milton Friedman,has been widely used to describe monetary financing, with the pre­ferred pro­posal being either a (one-off) tax break or cash handout to citizens or a per­manent mone­ti­sation of a pro­portion of the fiscal deficit. The main advantage of such a policy, its advo­cates argue, is that it would boost demand without adding to either public or private debt levels (…).“ bto: Das hilft natürlich, wenn man den Nenner schneller wachsen lassen will als den Zähler.
  • „Our review shows that for a large and eco­no­mically suc­cessful period of the 20th century (1930- 1970), monetary financing in various guises was an integral aspect of macroe­co­nomic policy. It was an important means by which govern­ments were able to reflate eco­nomies fol­lowing the Great Depression, finance World War II, and finance fiscal expansion, indus­trial policy and inno­vationin the post-war period despite high initial public debt-to-GDP ratios.“ – bto: und das vor dem Hin­ter­grund eines Booms, getrieben aus Basis­in­no­va­tionen und Bevöl­ke­rungs­wachstum. Was zur Frage führt, ob es in einem gegen­tei­ligen Umfeld auch so funk­tio­niert. Ob es zudem wirklich der Treiber hinter Inno­va­tionen war, kann auch gründlich hin­ter­fragt werden.
  • „The his­to­rical evi­dence sug­gests dif­ferent forms of monetary financing were not only used during eco­nomic down­turns, but also more rou­tinely to support fiscal expansion and Keynesian full-employment policies. (…) the current debate (…) neglects the pos­si­bility of longer term fiscal-monetary coor­di­nation to direct resources into the most pro­ductive areas of the economy – with resulting mul­ti­plier effects – and sti­mulate demand.“ – bto: der Traum für alle Poli­tiker! Sie können wieder die Welt retten, indem sie mehr Geld ausgeben.
Pro­fi­ter­war­tungen ent­scheiden über das Wachstum
Sodann kommen wir erst mal zum Grund­sätz­lichen, zur Funk­ti­ons­weise unseres Wirt­schafts­systems, passend zu dem, was auf bto unter Eigentumsökonomik/Debitismus aus­führlich dis­ku­tiert wurde. Immer mal wieder wert, nach­ge­lesen zu werden. Erspar­nisse folgen der Geld­schöpfung durch Kredit: „(…) eco­no­mists fol­lowing Schum­peter and Keynes have empha­sised that capi­talist systems are ‘monetary pro­duction’ eco­nomiesin the sense that investment in the real economy requires financing prior to the exis­tence of savings. Here the com­mercial banking sector plays a key role as it is able to issue lia­bi­lities upon itself to finance new investment for cre­dit­worthy bor­rowers without relying on pre-existing savings.“ – bto: Wer das nicht ver­steht, der ver­steht auch nicht, wie die Wirt­schaft funk­tio­niert und erst recht nicht, wie es zu Krisen kommen muss.
  • For stable eco­nomic growth, advanced capi­talist eco­nomies thus require invest­ments that generate profits greater than debt com­mit­ments.“ – bto: und vor allem Ver­schuldung zu pro­duk­tiven Zwecken, nicht nur für Konsum und Spekulation!
Was dann zur Schluss­fol­gerung führt, dass der Staat und die Notenbank über die Beein­flussung der Gewinn­erwar­tungen erheb­lichen Ein­fluss auf die Wirt­schaft nehmen können, viel mehr als nur durch das Mani­pu­lieren der Zinsen. Dabei kann gerade eine Koor­di­nation der Geld- und Fis­kal­po­litik viel bewegen, vor allem, weil sich kein Zusam­menhang zwi­schen dem Verlust der Unab­hän­gigkeit der Notenbank und der Inflation fest­stellen lässt, so die Autoren in einem Über­blick über die ein­schlägige Fachliteratur. 
Zur Empirie des Helikoptergeldes
Zunächst zeigen die Autoren, welche Bedeutung die Noten­banken und die natio­nalen Geschäfts­banken bei der Staats­fi­nan­zierung hatten: 
Quelle: UCL
  • „(…) for long periods of the 20th century, in par­ti­cular the 1930s-1970s period, there is clear evi­dence of fiscal-monetary policy coor­di­nationwhereby both central banks and com­mercial banks were required (covertly or overtly) to purchase government debt to support fiscal policy objec­tives (including eco­nomic growth and debt sus­taina­bility). And even where the majority of monetary financing involved the purchasing of assets on secondary markets, this can still be seen as a form of indirect – or ‘two-step’ – monetary financing. This is because it will affect the demand for and yield on government debt, and reduce the net debt ser­vicing burden of the government. It is also worth noting that up until the 1990s, over 50% of larger com­mercial banks were, in fact, state owned, making their lending policies more aligned with government eco­nomic policy gene­rally.“ – bto: Es ist klar, dass es hier eine sehr enge Beziehung gegeben hat und eigentlich auch wieder gibt.
Die Autoren sehen einen klaren Zusam­menhang zwi­schen der Finan­zierung von Staats­de­fi­ziten durch Geschäfts­banken und Noten­banken, wobei auch hier natürlich gilt, dass seine Kor­re­lation noch keine Kau­sa­lität ist: 
Quelle: UCL 
Es lässt sich auch kein klarer Zusam­menhang mit der Inflation erkennen. (even­tuell mit Blick auf die 1970er und die Noten­banken schon?) 
Quelle: UCL 
Was bei den Autoren zum Fazit führt: „For most of the 20th century, large quan­tities of government debt were funded by monetary insti­tu­tions, but there is little evi­dence that this led either to mis­al­lo­cation of capital and hence low growth or dan­ge­rously high levels of inflation.” – bto: Wir haben natürlich auch noch das Problem der Ver­mö­gens­preis­in­flation, die nicht in der Studie berück­sichtigt wird. Ohnehin kann man fragen, ob die Kon­su­men­ten­preis­in­flation der richtige Maßstab ist. 
Diese Tabelle der Studie gibt einen guten Über­blick über ver­gangene Phasen enger Koope­ration zwi­schen Noten­banken und Staaten: 
Quelle: UCL 
Bei­spiel 1: Direkte Finan­zierung des New Deals
  •  When Pre­sident Roo­sevelt came to power in 1933, he used the RFC to support his New Deal policies, creating public credit for infra­structure, machine-tool design machinery, manu­fac­turing and agri­culture, expanding the powers of the RFC to incor­porate lending to industry (Freeman 2006). Between 1933–45, the RFC lent $33 billion (over $1.2 trillion in today’s dollars), making it the largest lending insti­tution in the world at the time. (…) However, the estab­lishment of the RFC coin­cided with another important piece of legis­lation: The Banking Act of 1932. A primary pro­vision of the Act was to allow the Fed to use government secu­rities as col­la­teralfor Federal Reserve notes (on top of gold and com­mercial paper).” – bto: Die Finan­zierung des Staates wurde also offi­ziell ermöglicht.
  • „(…) the Federal Reserve began purchasing government secu­rities from the open market. The pro­gramme was not only expan­sionary, but was unpre­ce­dented in terms of scale and scope, amounting to roughly 15% of the monetary base and 2% of GNP. (…) Indeed, minutes taken from Federal Reserve Board meeting in April 193316 indicate that under Pre­sident Roo­sevelt the Federal Reserve Board voted to conduct open-market purchases in 1933 for the primary purpose of lowering the government’s debt ser­vicing costs.“ – bto: genau also das, was wir auch in der nächsten Phase der Krise sehen werden.
Bei­spiel 2: Schul­den­mo­ne­ta­ri­sierung in  Japan (1931–1937)
Ja, das gab es dort schon früher. So gesehen darf es nicht wundern, wenn die Japaner in die gleiche Richtung wieder unterwegs sind. 
  • „One of the most suc­cessful examples of direct debt mone­ti­sationwas the Takahasi government in Japan in the 1930s. Fol­lowing the aban­donment of the Gold Standard in 1931 and the resulting deva­luation of the yen, the Takahasi admi­nis­tration embarked on a massive fiscal expansion that reflated the economy out of the Great Depression. The expansion was largely funded via central bank money creation. In November 1932 the government began to sell entire issues of its deficit bonds directly to the Bank of Japan rather than private insti­tu­tions. Inflation and excess liquidity were then con­trolled by the Bank of Japan selling government bonds onto the open market. Central government spending rose from ¥1.42 billion (10.7% of GNP) in 1931 to ¥2.25 billion (14.7% of GNP)in 1933, a level at which it remained fixed, expanding the deficit from a 0.1% of GDP surplus to a 6.1% deficit.” – bto: wie sich die Zeiten doch ähneln. Dass es diesmal nicht so gut klappt, sollte eine Warnung für uns sein. Heute haben wir nämlich den demo­gra­fi­schen Gegenwind, was es eben ein echtes Ponzi-Problem macht.
  • Damals hat es gewirkt: „By 1933 Japan had emerged from the Great Depression and there was no signi­ficant inflation; by 1934 it was moving out of trade deficit into surplus. Inflation began to build up in 1935 and Taka­hashi reduced government spending, espe­cially military spending, to rein it in and ste­ri­lised his pre­vious budget deficits by selling bonds back into the open market.“ – bto: Erst danach kam es zu einer Über­treibung, nachdem Takahasi ermordet wurde und der Nach­folger das Militär groß­zügig mit fri­schem Geld finanzierte.
Bei­spiel 3: Zwangs­fi­nan­zierung durch Privatbanken
  • So geht es natürlich auch: Man schreibt den Banken einfach vor, einen bestimmten Anteil in Staats­an­leihen zu halten (oder ermuntert wie heute in der Regu­lierung): „A third version of monetary financing is for govern­ments to borrow directly from private banksin much the same way that house­holds and busi­nesses do today.Given that sove­reign states with their own cur­rencies and central banks do not, in practice, default (as central banks can create cur­rency ex nihilo), govern­ments should be in a position to issue long-term loan con­tracts at very low rates of interest; alter­na­tively, states could simply force private banks to accept the loan issued at a maturity and rate of the government’s choosing. During and post-World War II a number of govern­ments engaged in this practice, including the US, (…)  Canada); and the UK. In the UK, the Tre­asury, fol­lowing Keynes’ advice, forced banks to buy Tre­asury Deposit Receipts (TDRs) at 1.125% interest to help finance World War II.“ – bto: Und auch nach dem Krieg gab es noch lange Vor­schriften, die eine Anlage zu nega­tivem Realzins, financial repression, durch­setzte, um die Schulden zu entwerten.
Fazit
  • „A number of eco­no­mists have argued that central banks’ QE policies would be effective at sti­mu­lating demand if they com­mitted to per­ma­nently mone­tising a pro­portion of their asset purchases: the so-called heli­c­opter drop. (…) Since central banks with sove­reign cur­rencies cannot default, the choice of whether to monetise becomes essen­tially a poli­tical-economy question.” – bto: Und deshalb wette ich darauf, dass diese zu gege­bener Zeit mit “Ja” beant­wortet wird. 
  • „Our exami­nation of his­to­rical trends and case studies suggest that monetary financing was an effective toolin sup­porting standard macroe­co­nomics policy goals such as nominal GDP growth and indus­trial policy without excessive inflation. (…) None of this is to deny that under certain other con­di­tions it is pos­sible that monetary financing will lead to inflation. However, our evi­dence sug­gests the reasons for this may not be those sug­gested by the rational expec­ta­tions models fea­tured in New Con­sensus eco­nomic theory which have an overly deter­mi­nistic view of the rela­ti­onship between monetary financing and inflation and rest on a faulty under­standing of the role of com­mercial bank credit creation. Weak gover­nance and tax-raising powers, cor­ruption and war, loss of control over exchange rates or bot­t­lenecks where the economy is at full capacity may be stronger can­di­dates to explain extended periods of inflation or hyper­in­flation.“ – bto: Das Umfeld hoher Schulden und die Demo­grafie gepaart mit der Glo­ba­li­sierung der (Arbeits-)Märkte und der Auto­ma­ti­sierung können auch künftig die Inflation in Zaum halten, egal was die Noten­banken machen. Aller­dings dürfte sich die Ver­mö­gens­wert­in­flation beschleunigen.
  • „(…) in most advanced eco­nomies today there are legal and con­sti­tu­tional impe­di­ments to govern­ments con­sidering bor­rowing directlyfrom central banks for extended periods. The rationale for this should perhaps be scru­ti­nised as part of the wider re-exami­nation of monetary and macroe­co­nomic policythat now appears to be under way in the post-crisis period, when central banks have been unable to sti­mulate aggregate demand or inflation using adjus­t­ments to interest rates.” – bto: was – wie gesagt – gerade auch in Europa pas­sieren wird.
  • „In the shorter term, however, govern­ments could con­sider debt mone­ti­sation via bor­rowing directly from private banks at below market interest rates, for which there are no legal or con­sti­tu­tional bar­riers. Monetary financing may provide greater fiscal autonomy to govern­ments, not least in the Eurozone, whose debt may be subject to spe­cu­lative attacks and/or who find it incre­asingly chal­lenging to increase deficits or raise taxes from a poli­tical economy per­spective.“ – bto: Bingo!

Dr. Daniel Stelter — think-beyondtheobvious.com
Uni­versity College of London: „Bringing the heli­c­opter to ground: A his­to­rical review of fiscal-monetary coor­di­nation to support eco­nomic growth in the 20th century“, August 2018